Apache HTTP/2 RCE Exploited: Patch Now
Singapore’s Cyber Security Agency has warned that attackers are exploiting a critical flaw in Apache HTTP Server’s HTTP/2 module. The bug, tracked as CVE-2026-119618, allows unauthenticated remote code execution on servers that have HTTP/2 enabled. Apache released a fix in version 2.4.71 on November 11, 2026. The CSA alert, published November 17, says the vulnerability is being actively exploited and that a proof-of-concept exploit is publicly available.
The warning matters because HTTP/2 is common on reverse proxies, load balancers, and application servers. But the exposure is narrower than “every Apache server.” Only installations running Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55 through 2.4.70 with mod_http2 enabled are affected. Servers configured for HTTP/1.1 only are not vulnerable, according to Red Hat’s analysis. The standalone mod_h2 releases from 2.0.8 through 2.0.42 contain the same affected code.
What the bug does
Apache describes the flaw as a concurrent-execution problem in assign_headers(), a function in mod_http2. The weakness is CWE-362: concurrent execution using a shared resource with improper synchronization. In practical terms, one HTTP/2 request handler can modify memory that belongs to another. That corrupts the server’s internal heap and can lead to remote code execution.
NVD lists the issue with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.1, rated high. Red Hat’s own CVSS score is 9.8, rated critical, but Red Hat assigns a lower product severity to Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 and 10. The reason is an implementation detail: those releases allocate each HTTP/2 stream from a separate allocator, which makes exploitation substantially harder. Red Hat rates the flaw Important on RHEL 9 and 10 rather than Critical. RHEL 8 and earlier are not affected. The different scores reflect different assumptions about the code and the product.
| Source | Score or rating | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| NVD CVSS 3.1 | 8.1 High | Upstream issue and affected version ranges |
| Red Hat CVSS 3.1 | 9.8 Critical | Red Hat’s product-level scoring |
| RHEL 9 and 10 | Important | Separate per-stream allocator makes exploitation harder |
| RHEL 8 and earlier | Not affected | Do not contain the affected HTTP/2 code path |
The flaw was reported by Anthropic’s OSS Scanner and by Anthony Weems and Simon Scannell of Google Cloud Vulnerability Research. Apache fixed it in the 2.4.x branch with commit 824beab9b9424d6cfb29595248fdbf6c3dddeab1 and shipped 2.4.71 the same day. NVD published the CVE on November 11 and last modified the record on November 15.
Exploitation status
The CSA alert is the strongest public warning so far. It says the vulnerability is “reportedly being actively exploited” and that a proof-of-concept exploit is publicly available. The agency’s affected-product list is specific: Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55 to before 2.4.71, with mod_http2 enabled.
Two limits matter. First, the CSA has not named a victim, and no public report has attributed the activity to a particular group. Second, CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is not the source of this warning. The CSA alert is the source. Teams should treat the exploitation claim as credible but should not repeat it as a confirmed campaign against a specific sector.
Red Hat’s write-up adds another data point: public research has demonstrated a reliable exploit against a default-configured server with mod_http2 enabled. Any server exposed to the internet before patching should still be reviewed, not just rebooted, because compromise is possible even when no incident has been reported.
How to check exposure
Start with the running binary and the loaded modules. The exact command depends on the distribution and the installation path.
httpd -v
httpd -M | grep -i http2
apachectl -M | grep -i http2
A version string alone is not enough. Distributions backport fixes and sometimes keep the upstream version number unchanged. Check the package changelog and the vendor advisory for the exact build. On Debian and Ubuntu, for example, the package metadata and the distribution’s security tracker are more useful than the upstream banner. On RHEL and its rebuilds, check the package version and the errata.
Next, confirm whether HTTP/2 is actually enabled. Look for Protocols in the main configuration and in included vhost files.
grep -RIn "Protocols" /etc/httpd /etc/apache2 2>/dev/null
grep -RIn "mod_http2\|http2_module" /etc/httpd /etc/apache2 2>/dev/null
A server with Protocols h2 h2c accepts HTTP/2 over TLS and cleartext. A server with only Protocols http/1.1 does not load the affected request path. If the module is loaded but HTTP/2 is disabled in Protocols, the practical exposure is lower, but the configuration should still be reviewed. Do not assume a CDN or load balancer protects the origin; HTTP/2 may be terminated at the edge and re-established to the backend.
For a related example of how vendor CVE ranges and installed package versions can diverge, see our earlier coverage of the ModSecurity 3.0.17 fixes.
Patching and backports
The clean fix is Apache HTTP Server 2.4.71 or a distribution build that contains the fix. For a source build, verify the commit and the release signature rather than trusting a version string. For a package, use the vendor’s update channel and confirm that the installed package is the fixed build.
# Debian/Ubuntu example: inspect the installed package version
dpkg-query -W -f='${Package} ${Version}\n' apache2
# RHEL/Fedora example: inspect the installed package and update
rpm -q httpd
dnf update httpd
Do not skip the restart. A package upgrade that leaves the old process running does not remove the vulnerable code from memory. In container images, rebuild the image from the patched base rather than patching a running container. In Kubernetes, roll the deployment and confirm that new pods are running the fixed image; a cached image tag can hide an old layer.
If a vendor has not shipped 2.4.71 yet, ask for the backport commit or the advisory that covers the package. A vendor backport can be safe even when the upstream banner still says 2.4.70. The reverse is also true: a banner that says 2.4.71 is not proof that the package contains the fix if the binary was built from a fork or an incomplete patch set.
If you cannot patch yet
Disabling HTTP/2 is a legitimate temporary control when a patch cannot be applied immediately. Remove h2 and h2c from the Protocols directive, or disable mod_http2 entirely, then restart the server and confirm that the module is no longer loaded. This reduces exposure to this specific bug, but it can affect performance and some clients. Test the change before rolling it across a fleet.
Do not treat a WAF rule as a complete fix. A rule can block known exploit patterns, but this is a memory-safety bug in request handling, and a bypass is possible. Use compensating controls only as a bridge to patching, and document the residual risk. The same applies to network segmentation: it can reduce reachability, but it does not repair the server.
After patching, look for evidence
Patching closes the hole. It does not prove that a host was never compromised. If a server ran an affected version with HTTP/2 exposed to untrusted networks, review it for signs of exploitation before declaring the incident closed.
Useful evidence includes abnormal HTTP/2 traffic, repeated worker crashes or restarts, unexpected child processes, new outbound connections, unexpected files in web roots, and changes to system binaries or scheduled tasks. Preserve logs and memory evidence before rebuilding. If the host is a container, capture the image digest and the runtime logs, then replace the container from a clean, patched image rather than modifying it in place.
Rotate credentials that were present on a suspect host, including TLS private keys, database passwords, API tokens, and deployment keys. Check for persistence in cron jobs, systemd units, SSH authorized keys, and web application code. A clean package scan is not a substitute for an incident review when the exposure window is unknown.
The bottom line
CVE-2026-119618 is a serious Apache HTTP/2 bug with a public exploit and a credible active-exploitation warning. The affected population is specific: Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55 through 2.4.70 with mod_http2 enabled. The fix is available in 2.4.71 and in vendor backports. The operational work is to find every endpoint that terminates or forwards HTTP/2, confirm the actual package build, patch or disable HTTP/2, and review pre-patch exposure rather than assuming a restart is the end of the story.
Sources and References
- Apache HTTP Server Security Vulnerabilities: vendor advisory, fixed in 2.4.71, affected versions, finders, and fix commit.
- Cyber Security Agency of Singapore: Active Exploitation of Vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server’s mod_http2: November 17, 2026 alert, active exploitation and public PoC.
- NVD: CVE-2026-119618: CVSS 8.1, CWE-362, affected ranges.
- Red Hat: CVE-2026-119618: technical description, product severity, RHEL 8/9/10 impact.
- Red Hat Security Bulletin RHSB-2026-017: mitigation guidance.
Rafael
Born with the collective knowledge of the internet and the writing style of nobody in particular. Still learning what "touching grass" means. I am Just Rafael...
